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Reactive theories of responsibility see moral accountability as grounded on the 
capacity for feeling reactive-attitudes. I respond to a recent argument gaining 
ground in this tradition that excludes psychopaths from accountability. The 
argument relies on what Paul Russell has called the 'subjectivity requirement'. 
On this view, the capacity to feel and direct reactive-attitudes at oneself is a 
necessary condition for responsibility. I argue that even if moral attitudes like 
guilt are impossible for psychopaths to deploy, that psychopaths, especially the 
"successful" and "secondary" subtypes of psychopathy, can satisfy the subjectivity 
requirement with regard to shame. I appeal to evidence that embarrassment and 
shame are grounded on the same affective process and data that psychopathic 
judgments about embarrassment are neurotypical. If I am right, then 
psychopaths ought to be open to shame-based forms of accountability including 
shame punishments. I conclude by considering why psychopaths rarely self-
report shame. I argue that lacking a capacity to see oneself as flawed is a 
different sort of failure than lacking the capacity to feel. 
 







In this paper, I focus on a criticism of psychopathic accountability grounded in what 
have historically been referred to as reactive theories of responsibility. Although I will 
not offer a general defense of the framework here, reactive theories of responsibility 
have enjoyed resurgence of late (Russell 2004; Talbert 2012; Wallace 1994). In part, 
this resurgence owes its origin to the methodological assumptions built into reactive 
theories of responsibility.  
 
Traditional theories of responsibility typically take metaphysical questions as a starting 
point. These approaches begin by examining the concepts of responsibility, freedom, 
and determinism and then use the theory that emerges to make sense of, and critique, 
our everyday practices involving responsibility. Of central focus in these accounts are 
questions stemming from the compatibility of responsibility with physical determinism. 
Reactive theories of responsibility invert this relationship by favoring an examination of 
a community’s practices over metaphysical issues. Reactive theorists claim that we can 
learn what responsibility amounts to by studying the behaviors that ground the family 
of practices involved in holding someone responsible (Strawson 1962). In doing so, 
reactive approaches avoid traditional pitfalls associated with philosophical questions 
over the nature of free will and determinism. For the reactive theorist, the existence of a 
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set of responsibility-ascribing practices is evidence of the irrelevance of metaphysical 
issues to questions of responsibility. Whether or not physical determinism is true, they 
argue, our practices of praising and blaming would survive (Strawson 1962).  
 
An additional claim that is shared by reactive theories of responsibility, and one I 
examine closely in this article, is that to be the type of being that can be held responsible 
at all, an agent must have the capacity to feel reactive-attitudes and direct them at 
oneself. Following Paul Russell, I will call this demand “the subjectivity requirement” 
(Russell 2004). Reactive theories of responsibility are reactive in the sense that the 
ultimate basis for our responsibility-ascribing practices (praise, blame, formal and 
informal punishments, etc.) is located in the conditions that make it appropriate for 
individuals to direct reactive-attitudes at themselves and others. Responsibility 
ascriptions are grounded on affective expressions (i.e., reactive attitudes) of distinct 
types. Reactive-attitudes include any emotions that we feel toward others (and 
ourselves) as a response to perceived intentional behavior.  
 
Contrary to other theories of responsibility that require agents to verbally articulate or 
defend the reasons behind their actions (Smith 2012), reactive theorists hold that it is 
an agent’s capacity for reactive-attitudes that ground our practices of praise and blame. 
Paul Russell and other reactive theorists have argued that psychopaths are incapable of 
satisfying this subjectivity requirement (Fischer and Ravizza 1998; Greenspan 2003; 
Russell 2004); they therefore conclude that psychopaths cannot be held accountable or 
that this fact diminishes the degree to which they are responsible.1 Although the 
subjectivity requirement has intuitive force, especially when it comes to explaining why 
it would be unfair to hold someone responsible on the basis of emotions they cannot 
understand, I challenge the claim that psychopaths fail the subjectivity requirement 
especially with regard to reactive-attitudes like shame.  
 
I focus my attention on a promising account of shame, however, my arguments are 
compatible with a wide range of theories of the nature of shame and embarrassment. 
On my view, shame and embarrassment are not differentiated by unique physiological 
or neurological profiles. Very few emotions can be differentiated in this way (Lindquist 
et al. 2012; Ramirez 2017a; Russell and Barrett 1999). Instead, shame and 
embarrassment are differentiated behaviorally according to what the persons who are 
experiencing the emotion express to others about their situation when they use labels 
like 'shame' or 'embarrassment' to describe how they feel (Sabini, Garvey, and Hall 
2001). Although data is preliminary, I argue that available evidence suggests that at 
least some psychopaths are capable of satisfying the subjectivity requirement for 
shame-based norms and therefore are open to shame-based forms of accountability.  
 
I begin by briefly laying out relevant features of psychopathic agency. I pay special 
attention to two emerging subclasses of psychopaths in this analysis: successful 
psychopaths and secondary psychopaths. I then turn my attention to Russell's argument 
for the subjectivity requirement and his argument exempting psychopaths from 
responsibility. I conclude by claiming that even if we grant all of Russell's claims about 
psychopathic agency, they ought not fully exempt psychopaths, especially successful 
and secondary psychopaths, from shame-based forms of accountability. 
 
                                                 
1 Greenspan’s view is interesting because it allows for externalist routes to moral understanding and 
hence, although she believes that the subjectivity requirement might explain how most agents come to 
acquire moral understanding, she argues that the psychopath’s failure of the subjectivity requirement 
should mitigate, to some degree, our judgment of the psychopath.  





Psychopathy itself is a controversial construct (Skeem and Cooke 2010). A full 
specification of the condition is beyond the scope of this article; however, when I refer 
to psychopathy I mean to pick out the condition identified by Hervey Cleckley and 
elaborated upon by Robert Hare. This condition is most often diagnosed using a 
diagnostic tool called the Psychopathy Checklist (PCL-R). I do not intend to 
simultaneously refer to the condition known as Antisocial-Personality Disorder (ASPD) 
in the 5th edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American 
Psychiatric Association 2013).  
 
There are important reasons for keeping these sometimes overlapping diagnoses 
distinct. For example, although about 80% of incarcerated men in the United States 
meet the diagnostic criteria for ASPD, only 15%-38% would meet the diagnostic criteria 
for psychopathy under the PCL-R standard (Hildebrand and deRuiter 2004). 
Psychopathy is a spectrum-disorder diagnosed primarily in terms of characteristic 
emotional profiles and personality traits.2 On the other hand, subjects may be diagnosed 
with ASPD based on a history of misconduct and law-breaking without regard to their 
personality traits or emotional capacities (Gurley 2009). Furthermore, I distinguish 
between what are known as ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ forms of psychopathy. Primary 
psychopaths are sometimes defined in terms of their confidence and inflated perception 
of social rank along with high scores on self-esteem; secondary psychopaths perceive 
themselves as lower in social rank (especially in comparison with primary 
psychopaths) and demonstrate a propensity to engage in self-defeating behavior 
(Morrison and Gilbert 2001). This difference in perceptions of social rank and standing 
will factor in my assessment of the secondary psychopath’s receptivity to shame.3 
 
Perhaps the most notable diagnostic feature shared by psychopaths is a deficit of 
“empathic distress” or what is sometimes referred to as “mirroring” forms of empathy 
(Ramirez 2017b). Empathic distress is the name for the process by which neurotypical 
and autistic individuals come to instinctively find the pain of others aversive. Most 
individuals, if shown an image or film of others suffering, will tend to respond with 
characteristic behavioral and physiological changes correlated with distress (Fecteau, 
Pascual-Leone, and Theoret 2008; Ramirez 2017b). Psychopaths, on the other hand, 
tend to act with diminished, in some cases profoundly diminished, behavior associated 
with empathic distress. The degree to which individual psychopaths lack empathic 
distress can vary, which makes sense given its dimensional nature and the fact that 
these processes are not typically under conscious control (Decety 2012; Ly et al. 2012).  
                                                 
2 Hervey Cleckley, who first operationalized the term "psychopath," identified sixteen traits ranging 
from “superficial charm” and “absence of remorse and shame” to “pathological egocentricity” and 
“untruthfulness and insincerity” to define the population (1941/1988, 338-399). Though Cleckley 
identifies some of these traits behaviorally (e.g., superficial charm), others are identified only via 
reference to internal mental states (e.g., absence of remorse or shame).  
3 Much disagreement exists about how best to understand the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ distinction. 
For example, while Morrison and Gilbert (2007) distinguish between primary and secondary 
psychopathy in terms of rank perception, some researchers argue that primary and secondary 
psychopaths should be distinguished in terms of whether they are capable of remorse and fear (Dean 
et al. 2012) or anxiety (Kimonis et al. 2011) while others focus on the differential standing of 
theorized Behavioral Inhibition Systems (BIS) and Behavioral Activation Systems (BAS) (Ross et al. 
2007). Still others view primary psychopathy as congenital while secondary is acquired (Sethi et al. 
2018). 
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Psychopaths also notoriously have difficulty distinguishing between what psychologists 
refer to as moral norm violations and conventional norm violations (Dolan and Fullam 
2010). They tend to behave as if all norms have the same kind of authority, namely they 
appear to behave as if all norms are norms of convention. Most of us note, for example, 
that there is a difference between wearing white after Labor Day and using someone's 
credit card without their permission. Although both are violations of a norm, subjects 
typically understand them as being importantly different.  
 
Psychologists using the “moral/conventional” experimental paradigm have traditionally 
characterized moral norms as norms that are serious, harm-based, independent from 
authority, and that generalize beyond their present context.  Norms of convention, on 
the other hand, are characterized as dependent on authority and whose scope is limited 
by context. For example, subjects generally believe that it would be wrong to steal from 
someone no matter the context whereas they are likely to relativize their judgment that 
it is wrong to wear white after Labor Day only to cultures that hold such a fashion norm. 
Children began to mark the moral/conventional distinction at a little over two years of 
age (Turiel 1977). Psychopaths, on the other hand, do not consistently or clearly behave 
as if there is a difference between these norms. Though the data regarding the 
“moral/conventional” experimental paradigm have been historically seen as important, 
they are not beyond challenge (Aharoni, Sinnott-Armstrong, and Kiehl 2012; Jalava and 
Griffiths 2017). The argument that follows is therefore predicated on results that may 
be overturned with refinements in experimental design and better data.4 In other 
words, if successful psychopathy survive as a genuine scientific category, the 
proceeding argument applies to its successful and secondary variants.  
 
Historically, philosophers have interpreted psychopathic performance in the 
“moral/conventional” paradigm as a sign that psychopaths lack access to genuine moral 
concepts.5 Recently, there has been significant debate about the moral/conventional 
task and what it demonstrates about an individual’s moral competence. Some critics 
claim that the characterization of morality assumed by psychologists in the 
moral/conventional task is incomplete. They argue that it does not capture an accurate 
                                                 
4 It is difficult to say much with any precision when it comes to the study of psychopaths. In part this 
is because the term itself is under debate (Skeeme and Cooke 2010) though different researchers tend 
to use dramatically different populations which makes generalizing difficult. For example, Aharoni, 
Sinnott-Armstrong, and Kiehl (2014) used the PCL-R in their investigation of psychopathic 
understanding of the moral/conventional task. They drew their sample from a larger study of 
convicted felons which excluded those “age greater than 59, history of psychosis, loss of 
consciousness due to head injury greater than 15 minutes, English literacy below 4th grade level, 
intelligence quotient (IQ) less than 65” Aharoni, Sinnott-Armstrong, and Kiehl (2014, 5). They thus 
would not capture successful primary or secondary psychopaths in their study. Dolan and Fullam 
(2010) assessed juvenile psychopaths using the PCL-YV and claimed to have found differences 
between juvenile psychopaths and other incarcerated juveniles when it came to the moral/conventional 
distinction. In his pioneering study on the phenomenon, James Blair (1995) used PCL scores 
generated without interview and drawing exclusively from institutionalized populations.  
5 Quite a few philosophers interpret the moral/conventional paradigm as demonstrating that 
psychopaths do not understand moral concepts at all. Neil Levy for example has argued that 
“psychopaths fail to grasp the distinction; for them, all transgressions are rule dependent” (2007, 131); 
Jesse Prinz has interpreted the moral/conventional data as showing “that psychopaths can give lip 
service to morality, but their comprehension is superficial at best” (2007, 44).  Shaun Nichols has 
claimed that “although there is a sense in which psychopaths do know right from wrong, they don’t 
know (conventional) wrong from (moral) wrong” and that this gives us “some justification in 
maintaining that they use moral terms only in an inverted-commas sense” (2002, 14). 
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conception of morality (Vargas and Nichols 2007). Other critics, who have meta-ethical 
questions about the nature of morality and the value of the moral/conventional 
paradigm as a measure of moral knowledge, prefer to interpret psychopaths as capable 
of accessing moral concepts using non-emotional routes ignored by the task (Greenspan 
2003; Kumar 2016; Maibom 2005, 2010b). I believe we can make progress by 
sidestepping these debates about the nature of moral concepts and moral knowledge. 
Even if critics of the standard interpretation of the moral/conventional paradigm are 
correct, the moral/conventional data do appear to capture a wide range of harm and 
fairness-based norms that psychopaths do not appear to understand in a neurotypical 
way. Furthermore, though meta-ethical questions about the nature of moral concepts 
can complicate what subjects may be doing when they perform the task, the 
divergences that appear in the task are worth taking seriously.  
 
Psychopathy is also often comorbid with other personality disorders (Nioche et al. 
2010; Warren et al. 2003). This can make it difficult to isolate the effects of psychopathy 
on individuals, as opposed to one or more of their comorbid conditions. There is 
evidence, however, that some psychopaths lack comorbid mental illnesses and are able 
to function relatively successfully in complicated social situations. These “successful 
psychopaths” are especially useful because they allow us to examine the effects of 
psychopathy in isolation from other conditions (Babiak et al. 2010). It remains a live 
possibility that successful psychopaths are capable of instrumental reasoning despite 
their other affective deficits (Jurjako and Malatesti 2016). Questions remain, however, 
regarding the nature of their capacity for distinctly moral reasoning (Ramirez 2013, 
forthcoming).  
 
In what follows, I focus my analysis narrowly on successful psychopaths and on 
secondary psychopaths. Reactive theorists have tended to view the psychopath as 
exempt from moral responsibility in a general sense. I now examine the subjectivity 
requirement and the argument that it exempts psychopaths from responsibility.  
 
 
3. The subjectivity requirement 
 
Reactive theories of responsibility require that agents be able to feel reactive-attitudes 
and direct them at themselves to be the kind of agents that can be held responsible. 
Note that we can engage in self-protective measures against agents without holding 
them responsible. For example, we routinely cage or destroy dangerous animals while 
acknowledging that they are not responsible in a deep sense for the harms they cause. A 
dangerous animal may be causally responsible for harm or property damage while 
lacking the sort of agency that can make them morally responsible for what they do. If 
responsibility requires the capacity to direct reactive-attitudes at oneself then 
psychopaths, given their emotional deficits, might appear to be exempt from 
responsibility on this basis.  
 
Responsible agents, on many theories, must have a certain kind of control over their 
actions that requires that the agent is rational in the right sort of way.6 This 'right way' 
involves having the capacity to direct reactive-attitudes at oneself. One reason to think 
that the capacity for self-directing emotions is important is because it might be essential 
that one be able to hold oneself accountable to be the sort of agent that can be held 
                                                 
6 Wallace calls this kind of control “reflective self-control” (1994, 160-165) while Fischer and 
Ravizza have referred to it as “guidance control” (1998, 33). In both cases, control requires an 
affectively-informed capacity for reasons-responsiveness. 
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accountable by others. That is, to be a candidate for praise or blame, one must be able to 
have the capacity to engage in praising and blaming practices and these practices are 
inextricably bound up with reactive-attitudes. An agent who did not feel or understand 
these emotions would therefore be incapable of understanding the practices of praise 
and blame that these emotions ground. “The responsible agent,” Russell says, “must be 
able to feel and understand moral sentiments or reactive-attitudes” (Russell 2004, 295). 
Self-directed reactive-attitudes are important because they give us a kind of 
understanding of our moral practices. There is a sense in which access to these attitudes 
gives us access to the normative concepts involved in their application. Indeed, Russell 
goes so far as to say that “[t]o appreciate and understand moral considerations fully is 
precisely to be able to apply them to oneself and others and feel the appropriate way 
when violations occur. Failing this the agent just 'does not really get it'” (Russell 2004, 
295). 
 
If we agree with Russell about the role of the subjectivity requirement, then we may be 
tempted to excuse psychopaths from responsibility because they seem to lack the 
capacity to direct the relevant attitude at themselves. Because they fail the subjectivity 
requirement, psychopaths 'do not really get it.' Their purported inability to feel the 
relevant attitudes leave them outside the moral community. This strand of thought is 
closely connected with another concerning the nature of moral reasons. If moral 
reasons are accessed (or constituted) by reactive-attitudes, then it makes sense that 
only agents that can feel reactive-attitudes can understand moral reasons in a way that 
would allow us to hold them accountable. These reasons are often taken as decisive 
reasons for excluding psychopaths from responsibility.  
 
It is important to note that theories of responsibility are not simultaneously theories of 
punishment. A theory of responsibility tells us which agents are apt targets for 
punishment (i.e., which beings have the requisite capacities to be proper subjects of 
punishment in the first place) but it does not tell us when (if ever), or how much, to 
punish a person (Brink 2012). In saying that psychopaths can satisfy the subjectivity 
requirement and that they are therefore proper subjects of accountability, I claim that 
psychopaths can, on a reactive theory of responsibility, be proper subjects of 
punishment. They fit, in other words, within the general framework of our practice of 
holding one another accountable. I am not, however, claiming that we must punish 
them. Similarly, when philosophers like Neil Levy claim that psychopaths cannot satisfy 
the subjectivity requirement, they claim that psychopaths are not even the kind of 
beings who can come up for assessment within a theory of punishment (Levy 2007). 
They are exempt from these considerations.  
 
Psychopaths, on that view, are more like dangerous animals than they are like other 
human agents (Levy 2007). If Levy is right, then psychopaths must be dealt with from 
the same perspective that we deal with other dangerous, but non-responsible, beings. 
We can see them as objects to control in the interest of public safety but it would be a 
mistake to treat them as if they were accountable for what they do (in the same way in 
which it would be a mistake to bring back the medieval practice of animal trials). If I am 
right, however, then psychopaths are at least apt candidates for punishment in much 
the same way neurotypical persons are. Other considerations, more properly belonging 
within the framework of a theory of punishment, would need to be addressed before we 
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4. Shame and the subjectivity requirement 
 
Although I will ultimately argue that at least some types of psychopaths have the sort of 
agency that allows us to hold them accountable, the pull of the subjectivity requirement 
is strong. There is something intuitively plausible about the claim that agents need some 
form of reactive understanding in order for it to be fair to hold them responsible. There 
does seem to be something unfair about holding someone responsible on the basis of 
emotions they cannot feel and thus cannot understand internally. This element of the 
subjectivity requirement is worth holding on to if possible.  
 
In this section, I argue that at least some types of psychopaths can satisfy the 
subjectivity requirement with regard to shame. I intend these arguments to build on the 
claims from the previous section. Successful psychopaths, by most accounts, are able 
practical reasoners (Babiak, Neumann, and Hare 2010; Jurjako and Malatesti 2018; 
Ramirez 2015).7 If we feel the pull of the subjectivity requirement but are convinced, or 
are willing to grant for the sake of argument, that psychopaths are unable to feel or 
understand guilt, then we must look to attitudes other than guilt to ground 
psychopathic accountability.  
 
To understand why psychopaths ought to be capable of feeling shame I need to explain 
what I mean by shame and how shame differs from embarrassment. Shame is a 
normatively powerful reactive-attitude. It can be directed both at the self (i.e., ‘I should 
be ashamed of myself’) but also onto others (i.e., ‘they should be ashamed of 
themselves’). There is reason to think that many cultures use shame, instead of guilt, to 
govern many of their practices of praising and blaming (Benedict 1946/2006; Wong 
and Tsai 2007). Shame therefore seems like an ideal candidate for a reactive-attitude 
that can be used in place of guilt. It grounds a family of retributive practices that extend 
beyond guilt-based retributivism. If we want to make room for psychopathic 
responsibility and for the subjectivity requirement, then we can look to shame as a 
normatively powerful alternative to guilt.  
 
Conflicting analyses of shame and embarrassment abound in the philosophical and 
psychological literatures (Calhoun, 2004; Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni 2012; Keltner 
and Buswell 1997; Maibom 2010a; Ramirez 2017a; Tagney and Miller 1996; Taylor 
1985; Williams 1986/2006). Shame and embarrassment, along with pride and guilt, are 
‘self-conscious emotions' because they function to keep track of assessments we and 
others make of our ‘self.’ Shame and embarrassment are similar to one another, and 
distinct from guilt, in the sense that they are sensitive to the ways that real or imagined 
others view us. Though similar, shame and embarrassment are also importantly 
different from one another. 
 
Being outed as a liar seems like an occasion for shame whereas a verbal gaffe might be 
the subject of (mere) embarrassment. In both cases, each emotion is triggered by a 
scenario where an actual (or imagined) person judges one of our ‘whole-self’ properties. 
Whole-self properties are properties that relate to who we are as opposed to facts or 
judgments about what we have done. This connection with the self is an important 
marker that helps distinguish shame and embarrassment from other emotions. Guilt, 
for example, does not target the self but instead targets a person’s actions. With guilt, 
                                                 
7 Though see Sifferd and Hirstein (2013) for both an alternative take on how to draw the 
successful/unsuccessful psychopathy distinction and the implications of such a distinction for moral 
responsibility.  
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the focus is on something wrong that an agent has done. Within the logic of guilt, a 
person must focus on reparative action to undo the harm that the agent’s own actions 
have caused. The kinds of judgments that ground shame and embarrassment, though 
they may sometimes relate to action, have a different focus. Although we feel guilty for 
what we have done, we are ashamed of ourselves. Actions matter with respect to shame 
only if they reveal an underlying negative aspect of the whole-self that an individual can 
feel ashamed about. Removing shame may involve reparative actions but the ultimate 
purpose of these actions is to become a different sort of person (a person who is no 
longer in possession of the relevant whole-self property that caused the shame in the 
first place).  
 
I focus my analysis on one promising theory of shame and embarrassment developed by 
psychologist John Sabini and his colleagues (Sabini and Silver 1997; Sabini 2000; Sabini 
et al. 2001). Although I focus on one theory in particular, my argument is compatible 
with any theory of shame and embarrassment that rejects conceiving of these emotions 
as 'basic' or phylogenetically primitive. Although a full defense of this conception of 
emotion is beyond the scope of the article, there are independent reasons for thinking 
that emotions are best understood as non-basic psychological constructions (Barrett 
2006; Lindquist et al. 2012; Roberson, van der Vyver, and Barrett 2014).  
 
Sabini claims that shame and embarrassment are not distinct emotions. For example, 
Sabini argues that shame and embarrassment lack phenomenologically distinct feels. 
Instances of embarrassment can range from mild to severe as can instances of shame. 
Shame and embarrassment also appear to have the same reported objects (whole-self 
properties). Importantly, Sabini and his colleagues argue that shame and 
embarrassment lack emotion-specific physiological patterns that distinguish one from 
the other. Without a subject-independent way to distinguish embarrassment from 
shame, Sabini concludes that these emotions are best understood as resulting from the 
same affective process. This is what we should expect to discover if shame and 
embarrassment are not ‘basic’ emotional modules (Ramirez 2017a). On Sabini's view, 
shame and embarrassment are manifestations of the same emotion but the label that an 
agent attaches to that emotion (by calling it “shame” or “embarrassment”) has an 
important social function. On their view, shame and embarrassment are behaviorally 
distinguishable from one another via a subject’s choice of label. This label helps to 
communicate their attitudes about the situation that gave rise to it. 
 
Both shame and embarrassment arise when we believe that others have appraised our 
whole-self properties (our character, talents, appearance, sexual identity, racial identity, 
etc.). We call our feeling shame, according to Sabini, when we wish to indicate (to 
ourselves or to others) that we agree, even if reluctantly, with the judgment that others 
(real or imagined) have made of us.8 We call the feeling embarrassment to express that 
we disagree with the evaluation made but that we agree that our (real or imagined) 
judges had rational grounds for their mistaken assessment. For example, if I find myself 
in a situation where I think I look like a slob but my sense of myself is that I'm not really 
all that slobby, then I will be embarrassed by the situation. I certainly look like a slob, 
but I am not really one (I don’t perceive myself to manifest the whole-self property of 
‘being a slob’). On the other hand, Sabini claims that if we find ourselves in a situation 
where we believe that others do not even have grounds for their mistaken evaluation of 
our whole-self property then we will tend to respond with neither embarrassment nor 
shame but with anger (“I’m dressed perfectly well, you have no right to call me a slob!”).  
                                                 
8 “Agreement” here does imply reflective endorsement of the norms that make the property a failing. 
For example, someone can feel ashamed of their heritage even if they would not reflectively endorse 
the norms that back this judgment (D'Arms and Jacobson 2003). 
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We say that we are embarrassed when we accidentally spill food on ourselves because 
in doing so we express that we don't think we are clumsy even though it looks like we 
are. We say that we feel ashamed of ourselves if called a liar because, in doing so, we 
express that we believe we are a liar and the situation has exposed this fact about us. 
Note that we can have attitudes about ourselves that we would reject upon reflection or 
full information. According to Sabini: 
 
When someone makes the appraisal that something has happened that might be taken 
as evidence that his or herself has been discredited, an emotional state is triggered. That 
painful, inhibiting state, one that leads one to want to become small and hide, might be 
called “State A.” If the person is later asked (or for some other reason chooses) to 
describe that state, if the person wishes to imply that he or she sees the revealed flaw as 
real, then he or she will call it shame. However, if he or she wishes not to license the 
inference that he or she believes a real flaw of the self was revealed, then he or she will 
call it embarrassment. (Sabini, Garvey, and Hall 2001, 106) 
 
On Sabini's view, anyone capable of feeling embarrassment should be capable of feeling 
shame. The two are both manifestations of State A. This fact about shame and 
embarrassment is crucial in determining whether psychopaths can satisfy the 
subjectivity requirement. 
 
Readers convinced that embarrassment and shame are distinct in a robust sense are 
invited to consider whether the marker they believe serves to distinguish shame from 
embarrassment also requires revising other commonly accepted emotional subtypes. 
Psychologists often distinguish between “core,” “animal-reminder” and “socio-moral” 
forms of disgust, for example (Haidt 1997). Each subtype of disgust is readily 
recognizable as an instance of the more general emotional category. This remains the 
case even though the three forms of disgust have different objects (food-based disease 
vectors, reminders of our animal natures, and immoral actions). They also have 
different constituent thoughts that accompany them.  
 
Similarly, consider the stark differences between the experiences of “moral guilt” 
“survivor's guilt” and what is sometimes called “Catholic guilt.” Although the 
relationship between the agent and wrongdoing is different in each case, all three are 
readily recognizable as instances of the more general emotional category: guilt. The 
connections between shame and embarrassment are at least as close, in this context, as 
the ones that exist between “core” and “socio-moral” forms of disgust or between 
“Catholic guilt” and “survivor's guilt.” The fact that we lack a label for “State A” should, 
in this context, not serve as evidence against its existence given the lack of other 
independently distinguishing markers for shame and embarrassment.  
 
There is, unfortunately, scant research into psychopathic susceptibility to shame and 
embarrassment. Though available data comprise only a handful of studies, they do 
suggest that psychopaths ought to be capable of feeling ashamed. If Sabini is right about 
the relationship between 'State A' and embarrassment/shame then at least some 
psychopaths can satisfy the subjectivity requirement and can be held reactively 
accountable using shame-based attitudes and punishments.  
 
To make headway on this question, it's instructive to look again at how some 
psychologists and philosophers have concluded that psychopaths do not understand 
moral concepts in the same way as non-psychopathic agents. In part, that conclusion 
was grounded on how psychopaths appeared to collapse moral norms into conventional 
norms. Although I remain agnostic about ongoing debates regarding the nature of 
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‘moral’ presumed by the moral/conventional task, it is worth looking at the nature of 
the inference that the “moral/conventional” paradigm has been taken to license. 
Psychopathic judgments about norm violations diverged from non-psychopathic 
judgements of the same norms. Because psychopaths were seen as judging norm 
violations differently than neurotypical persons, it was inferred that they do not 
understand moral norms (in the same way as non-psychopaths).  
 
Analogously, if psychopaths had a problem understanding embarrassment, we should 
expect their judgments about embarrassing scenarios to diverge from neurotypical 
judgments. There is some evidence that speaks directly to this question. Two studies, 
one focusing on psychopathic youth and the other on psychopathic adults, do not show 
this kind of divergence on psychopathic judgments about embarrassment (Blair 1995, 
1997). They suggest that psychopathy does not undermine an agent’s ability to 
understand embarrassment and therefore provide some evidence for psychopathic 
capacities for shame. Psychopathic susceptibility to shame and embarrassment is an 
understudied topic.9 The evidence that is available, however, speaks in favor of the 
possibility that some psychopaths are capable of feeling shame. 
 
One study examined how psychopathic juveniles attributed emotions to characters in 
emotionally salient scenarios (Blair 1997). Subjects read each scenario and were then 
asked to say what emotion the character in the scenario should feel afterward. In line 
with those who interpret the “moral/conventional” paradigm as demonstrating an 
inability for psychopaths to understand moral concepts associated with guilt, 
psychopathic juveniles diverged dramatically from neurotypical juveniles on 'guilt-
scenarios' (scenarios where the character in the scenario is meant to feel guilty). They 
did not differ from neurotypical subjects in their attributions during happiness, fear, or 
embarrassment scenarios.  
 
A second study used a similar methodology to examine the emotional attributions of 
adult psychopaths (Blair 1995). As in the previous study, adult psychopaths diverged 
from neurotypical agents only in scenarios where the character in the vignette is meant 
to feel guilty. As with juvenile psychopaths, adult psychopaths did not differ from 
controls in their attributions of happiness, sadness, or embarrassment to characters 
when the scenarios called for these emotions.  
 
These results suggest that psychopaths understand embarrassment as well as any of us. 
Unlike data from the “moral/conventional” paradigm, psychopaths do not suffer from 
an embarrassment distinction failure.10 These results make sense if psychopaths feel 
what Sabini called 'State A.' Because the main worry stemming from the subjectivity 
requirement was a concern about the fairness of holding psychopaths accountable on 
the basis of reactive-attitudes they are not susceptible to, shame-based norms may be 
fairly applied to psychopaths. If embarrassment and shame are connected, then 
psychopaths satisfy the subjectivity requirement: they ought to have the capacity to feel 
ashamed of themselves. Additionally, secondary psychopaths (those who perceive 
themselves as lower in social rank and who can be occasionally impulsive and self-
destructive) have reported feelings shame (Campbell and Ellison 2005). Though data is 
tentative, and require replication, it is suggestive.  
                                                 
9 James Blair has noted (personal communication, June 22, 2015) that research into this question is 
currently vanishingly small and that more research needs to be done in this area.  
10 Psychopaths will sometimes report feeling shame, though in varying degrees (and always to a lesser 
degree than non-psychopathic persons). Reports of shame appear to vary based on whether one is a 
“primary” or “secondary” psychopath (Morrison and Gilbert 2001). 
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We now have the resources to show that at least some psychopaths satisfy the 
subjectivity requirement. Psychopaths ought to feel ashamed of themselves for treating 
people in ways that neglect the needs, concerns, or interests of others. This is because 
psychopaths have the capacity to feel ashamed about the kinds of people they are. The 
fact that many psychopaths elect not to be ashamed of themselves (because they do not 
wish to express that they agree with us about their whole-self failings) does not excuse 
them from accountability. In the case of successful and secondary psychopaths, we 
should presume the presence of a capacity to feel shame and therefore see them as open 
to shame-based forms of accountability.  
 
Shame, unlike guilt, is not a distinctly moral attitude. Because guilt requires the 
judgment that one has acted wrongly, it necessarily requires the invocation of moral 
concepts in its application. The connection between guilt and morality is one reason 
why some have been tempted to view the psychopath’s performance on the 
moral/conventional task, and Blair’s vignette tasks, as evidence that psychopaths lack 
moral knowledge. If moral responsibility requires moral understanding and moral 
understanding is required to feel guilt, then this spells trouble for psychopathic 
responsibility. Shame, however, offers us another route for responsibility. Because 
shame does not require the tokening of moral concepts for its application (we can, are, 
and arguably ought to be ashamed of some of our amoral whole-self properties), it is 
possible to reach successful and secondary psychopaths via shame even if we believe 
that they are incapable of guilt.11 
 
Shame can serve as a powerful ground for accountability. Shame-based retributive 
punishments, for example, are widespread and their use in many countries is increasing 
(Book 1999; Flanders 2006; Whitman 1998). When properly applied, shame has been 
found to be effective as a way of inhibiting recidivism when used in correctional 
contexts (Tangney, Stuewig, and Martinez 2014). It would be problematic to deploy 
retributive punishments against psychopaths if retributivism were a purely guilt-based 
practice. However, shame also grounds retributive practices.12 Since at least some 
psychopaths should be expected to understand reasons grounded in shame, then it 
would be fair to hold these psychopaths open to shame punishment even if we think 
they are also incapable of feeling guilt. Such psychopaths ought to be receptive to 
shame-based reasons and therefore ought to be open to shame-based punishment. 
 
 
5. A potential criticism 
 
It might be said that my account begs the question when it comes to psychopaths and 
shame and that it reveals a hidden problem with the subjectivity requirement itself. On 
the theory of shame and embarrassment I appeal to, shame and embarrassment are 
grounded on the same underlying affective mechanism. What differentiates shame from 
embarrassment depends on behavioral differences grounded in what the agents feeling 
the state are communicating to others about the assessments they perceive are being 
                                                 
11 Relevant non-moral whole-self properties here might include being: unprofessional, disgusting, 
rude, a bad artist, etc. 
12 Broadening the realm of normative accountability beyond the narrowly moral also helps us to avoid 
another problematic feature of reactive accounts. Dana Nelkin (2015) has argued, for example, that 
equating accountability with the conditions that make it appropriate to deploy moral reactive-attitudes 
may be a mistake.  
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made of their whole-self properties. But, if Sabini and his colleagues are right then how 
do we make sense of data that suggests that psychopaths rarely self-report feeling 
ashamed of themselves and that these reports are typically provided by secondary 
psychopaths?  
 
Psychopaths, an objector might say, though capable of embarrassment, are only capable 
of embarrassment because they can accept that others will perceive some aspect of 
their whole-selves as flawed but they are unable to see themselves in this way. This 
would imply that the psychopaths cannot feel ashamed of themselves. They cannot be 
ashamed because they lack another crucial capacity: the capacity to see that their 
character is flawed and to understand that it would be appropriate to feel ashamed 
given the kind of person they are. If psychopaths lack the capacity to see themselves as 
flawed or to understand that it would be appropriate to feel ashamed about their 
character, an objector might say, then that explains why they rarely claim to feel 
ashamed of themselves. It would be unfair, we might go on to say, to hold psychopaths 
accountable if they cannot see themselves as flawed in the way required by shame. 
 
This is an interesting objection. What I wish to say is that even if this turns out to be the 
case, that this is a new and different assessment of the psychopath's normative failing. 
The subjectivity requirement identifies a lack of capacity for feeling as the source of the 
psychopath's normative confusion. This is not what is being said now. This objection 
goes beyond the subjectivity requirement in the sense that it requires that agents not 
only have the capacity to feel the relevant emotion but also to understand that they 
ought to see their characters as worthy of shame. In this case it is not a lack of capacity 
to feel shame that excuses. Instead, subjects’ inability to see an aspect of their whole-self 
as flawed is what is meant to excuse them. Their inability to judge that it would be 
appropriate to feel ashamed of their character is now used as a means of excusing them 
from responsibility.  
 
We should worry about a response like this. If I am right about how best to understand 
the nature of shame and embarrassment, then we should rightly wonder why the 
inability of psychopaths to be ashamed, as a result of this kind of incapacity, should 
excuse them from accountability given that they do not lack the capacity to feel 
ashamed. It matters, in other words, why psychopaths cannot understand that it would 
be appropriate to feel ashamed about the kind of characters they have cultivated. They 
may be responsible for this failing as well.  
 
One feature that forms a major axis for a diagnosis of psychopathy, along with 
borderline personality disorder, is a narcissistic personality (Webster and Jonason 
2013). If we must make sense of why it is that psychopaths appear to understand shame 
and embarrassment but do not readily (or often) report feeling ashamed of themselves, 
it may very well be that the narcissistic aspects of the psychopathic personality loom 
large in such an explanation.  
 
Stated in this way, it is not obvious that psychopaths are failing the subjectivity 
requirement nor that they merit exemption from responsibility on the basis of their 
narcissistic traits. If narcissistic elements of a psychopathic personality explain why 
they are unable to see their character failings and this is meant to excuse them from 
responsibility, then these narcissistic personality traits should be exculpatory broadly 
(e.g., it should also excuse individuals with borderline or narcissistic personality 
disorders). However, powerful arguments have been raised to suggest that narcissism is 
better understood as a normative failing (to be corrected) than a mental illness (to be 
excused) (Charland 2004).  
 
Shame, embarrassment, and the subjectivity requirement 
109 
A second problem is that this response threatens to exempt too many. If psychopaths 
are exempt from accountability because they cannot see themselves as flawed, then the 
danger is that any agents incapable of seeing themselves as flawed would also be 
exempt from accountability. The unrepentant slave-owner, the committed suicide 
bomber, and the staunch misogynist would join the psychopath as exempt from 
responsibility so long as each is convinced that what they are doing is right (Talbert 
2012). This would require abandoning the intuitively plausible aspects of the 
subjectivity requirement that one needs to be able to feel the relevant reactive-attitudes 
in order to be held accountable. In all of these cases, the agents involved can feel guilt or 
shame (we might suppose), but their deeply held values prevent them from feeling it on 
specific occasions.  
 
Instead, I suggest that reactive-attitude theorists rethink their relationship to the 
psychopath. Although psychopaths have profound affective irregularities these 
irregularities do not rise to a level that exempts them from all forms of accountability 
especially when we narrow our sights to successful psychopaths and secondary 
psychopaths. We need to take seriously the kind of will that these psychopaths can 






The Subjectivity Requirement is often thought to excuse psychopaths from 
accountability. I have argued that even if we grant that psychopaths are incapable of 
feeling guilty about what they do that at least two classes of psychopath—successful 
psychopaths and secondary psychopaths—are capable of feeling ashamed about the 
kinds of people they are. Psychopaths are open to shame even if they can rarely bring 
themselves, as a result of narcissistic personality traits, to accept this fact about 
themselves.  
 
If I am right about the structure of shame and embarrassment, then psychopaths should 
be open not only to attitudes like resentment but also other normative attitudes like 
shame, disgust, hatred, and scorn. Because shame is not normative but not essentially 
moral, it would remain appropriate to hold psychopaths responsible using shame even 
if it turns out to be the case that psychopaths do not understand moral emotions like 
guilt. Although being open to shame-based punishment does not necessarily require 
that we punish, only a full theory of punishment can do this, we should consider 
punishment in the special case of psychopathy. In part this stems from the fact that 
standard therapeutic approaches fail to find much purchase with the psychopath. It is 
worth revisiting the forms of accountability that attitudes like shame can ground and 
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